Crime, Drug Prohibition and Terrorism

(Please note: For more updated information on the links between drugs, prohibition, and funding for terrorism, go to our sister website, Narcoterror.org.)

As the US government builds a coalition against Osama bin Laden, suspected of being responsible for the Pentagon and WTC attacks as well as wanted for the bombing of two US embassy buildings, attention is turning toward the US's allies. The result has been a growing awareness of the links between drug traffickers and producers, official corruption, arms dealing, rebel groups, and terrorists around the world. As the Wall Street Journal on October 2, 2001 ( "In Targeting Terrorists' Drug Money, US Puts Itself In An Awkward Situation"), reported:
"In its assault on terrorism, the U.S. may seek to choke off profits from the Central Asian drug trade that are used to buy arms and explosives. But some important potential allies in Washington's struggle with Afghanistan are also believed to be reaping the rewards of the nation's burgeoning heroin trade.
"Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistan's northern border with Tajikistan, a sworn ally in President Bush's antiterrorist efforts-and a major conduit for heroin and opium on its way to consumers in Europe."
The Journal further reports, "U.N. officials hesitate to guess which side has been making more from the drug trade in Afghanistan, which produces about 75% of the world's heroin. But they do think the anticipated U.S. retaliation against terrorists in Afghanistan, and perhaps the Taliban government itself, has sparked selling. The officials say Afghan drug dealers, expecting a Western Strike, appear to be selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash."

It is not only Afghans who are involved in the opium trade in that region. For instance, the Journal notes: "Drug money, in fact, has proved a lubricant for a peace agreement signed in 1997 that ended Tajikistan's civil war, analysts say. To persuade the country's competing warlords to lay down their arms, military leaders and their followers were given posts in the government. Now former warlords and their troops control portions of the Tajik border, regional police and customs. Says a Western diplomat: 'Government people are up to their eyeballs in the drug business.'"

Producers and traffickers in other parts of Asia are watching events unfold around Afghanistan, and are also keeping an eye on their own bottom line -- which some feel this recent turn of events may help improve. Again, from the Journal:
"Meanwhile, across the Stans and the Caspian Sea, in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, some pray for a speedy U.S. attack on Afghanistan. 'It's good for business,' says Muhammed, standing in a garage full of cannabis, a pistol tucked in his belt. He is just back from harvesting this year's cannabis crop. 'It'll drive up hashish prices,' he explains.
"Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2,500 kilograms ( 5,500 pounds ) to Amsterdam from the Bekaa-controlled by Syrian troops as well as Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fighters-can be arranged. Like most farmers in this remote region, he has returned to his time-honored crop for the first time in almost a decade. The revival of Lebanon's drug trade symbolizes the failure of Western attempts to persuade farmers to switch from high-value cannabis and poppy seeds to unprofitable potatoes and vegetables.
"There is a standard transport route here as well. The Bekaa's farmers say an Istanbul-based company moves the hashish from eastern Lebanon to Istanbul aboard Turkish trucks. In Istanbul, the hashish is switched to German-made trucks, with German license plates, headed for Bologna, in Italy. 'Transportation is no issue,' says Muhammed. 'I spoke to our transporters in Turkey this morning. The government isn't a problem either. We can deal with them.'"

The funding link between terrorist groups and narcotics trafficking is well known, and as well documented as any illicit activity can be. The term 'narcoterrorism' was first used to describe a terror campaign waged by traffickers against anti-narcotics police. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service in its October 1991 publication "Commentary No. 13: Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Dangerous Compromise In Colombia", noted: "Former President Belaunde Terry of Peru coined the term 'narcoterrorism' in 1983 when describing terrorist-type attacks against his nation's anti-narcotics police. Now a subject of definitional controversy, narcoterrorism is understood to mean the attempts of narcotics traffickers to influence the policies of government by the systematic threat or use of violence."

Narcoterrorism became a major issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the US fight against the Colombian Medellin cocaine cartel, more particularly in the fight by the cartel against extradition. Again from the CSIS:
"Variously described as 'the Robin Hood of Medellin', 'King Coke', or 'the most wanted man in the world', Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria surrendered to Colombian authorities in mid-June 1991. Accused leader of a major illicit narcotics organization known as the Medellin cartel, and suspected mastermind of a terrorism campaign responsible for the deaths and injuries of hundreds of Colombians, Escobar evaded capture throughout an intensive two-year manhunt. His voluntary capitulation was attributed to the government's introduction of revised counter-terrorism policies, including the promise of no extradition, coupled with arrangements for Escobar's incarceration in a prison located, constructed and staffed according to his personal specifications.
"Colombians generally welcomed the drug kingpin's surrender. The prospect of ending a decade of narcotics-related violence—violence that alone over the previous 24 months cost more than a thousand lives and millions of dollars—was reflected by opinion polls which endorsed the exceptional terms of the agreement with Escobar. The Colombian media and most politicians there largely hailed the outcome as a victory for the government, which in turn, moved quickly to underscore the impression by means of a full-page self-congratulatory advertisement in The New York Times."

Yet, the victory came at great cost. From the CSIS report again:
"Infuriated by government crack-downs, in 1984 the cartel embarked on a brutal reign of narcoterrorism. The assassination of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was the initial step in a campaign aimed at intimidating the Colombian political and judicial systems. Almost three years later, the narcoterrorism developed an international character when the cartel attempted the assassination of the Colombian Ambassador to Hungary, Enrique Parejo Gonzales, in Budapest. Parejo had earlier incurred the cartel's wrath when he succeeded the murdered Lara and implemented then-President Betancur's rejuvenated extradition policy. On year later, another proponent of extradition, Attorney-General Carlos Hoyos Jiménez, was killed, along with three body-guards, in a botched kidnapping attempt.
"Despite the cartel's egregiously brutal behaviour, Presidents Julio Turbay Ayala (1978-82), Belisario Betancur (1982-86) and Virgilio Barco (1986-90) remained firmly opposed to the traffickers' demands, especially pressures to rescind the extradition treaty. In August 1989, in what should have ultimately proved to be a disastrous error, the cartel murdered Senator Luis Carlos Galan, a highly popular presidential candidate. Meant as a warning that no one, no matter how prominent or influential, was beyond reach, the incident severely shocked a Colombian public weary of violence, and served to reaffirm the government's determination to defeat the traffickers.
"Designating narcoterrorism a serious threat to national security, President Barco invoked state-of-siege powers and emergency measures. In reply, the cartel 'declared war': over the 10 months which remained of Barco's term of office the traffickers countered with a horrific spate of assassinations, kidnappings and high-casualty car-bombings, as well as downing an AVIANCA airliner at a cost of 111 lives. Government attempts to apprehend the cartel leadership (recognized as centered on Pablo Escobar) for the most part proved fruitless. The security police, however, did achieve success in a number of ways: i) disrupting the traffickers' operations and infrastructure; ii) keeping the king-pins uncomfortably on the move; and, iii) occasionally eliminating a key individual (i.e. the death of Rodriguez Gacha in a raid)."

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• "Terrorists Get Cash From Drug Trade," Ottawa Citizen, Sept. 14, 2001
• "US Drug War Pays Afghans Who Aid Terrorists Who Attack US," Las Vegas Review-Journal, Sept. 19, 2001
• "Supporting America's Enemies," Rock River Times, Sept. 19, 2001
• "Afghan Drugs Linked To 'Terrorism' - UN Official," Reuters, Sept. 18, 2001
• "US Meets With Afghanistan Militia," Associated Press, Aug. 2, 2001

Additional resources available on the web

"The Links Between Drug Prohibition and Terrorism" from the Canadian Foundation for Drug Policy is an excellent summary of how drug prohibition has opened a treasure chest for terror and rebel groups around the world.
"The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drugs Trafficking and Terrorism," testimony by Ralf Mutschke, Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) General Secretariat before a hearing of the US House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Dec. 13, 2000.
The National Interagency Civil Military Institute began as the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute in 1989. NICI was created by Congress in response to the perceived need for interagency cooperation and communication in US anti-drug efforts. Then, "Pursuant to the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York, Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma, and the U.S. Air Force Barracks at Khobar, Saudi Arabia, NICI began in 1997 to develop and conduct courses in Anti-Terrorism as well as Community Response to Emergencies Scenario Training. In addition, NICI, under the direction of the US Army Military Police School, conducts Force Protection Level II training which is tailored to meet the mandatory training needs of soldiers prior to deployment to mid- and high-level threat areas throughout the world." (From the NICI website at http://www.nici.org/Nici/nici_logo.html ).
The Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence has several articles and publications of interest.
The Organization of American States publication from April 1995, "A New Vision of the OAS," features this chapter on Hemispheric Security and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking .

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